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NOTES AND COMMENTS
classification upon which the tax is based is the use of the room for the
purpose of displaying goods and securing orders for interstate sales;
and, therefore, the tax is, in reality, one upon the privilege of selling
rather than upon the privilege of use.
The tax having been shown to fall within the classification of a
privilege tax, 20 the rule laid down in the Robbins case2 1 and its suc-
cessors22 would seem applicable to invalidate it as being a direct and
undue burden upon interstate commerce. Recent decisions have modi-
fied the rule of the Robbins case as to what constitutes an interstate
sale. Banker Brothers v. Pennsylvania2 3 apparently limited the appli-
cation of the rule to cases where the out-of-state manufacturer or his
agent makes the sale; and Wiloil Corporation v. Pennsylvania held that
to constitute an interstate sale the contract must require interstate trans-
portation.24  Despite the modifications embodied in these decisions it
seems that the principal case does not fall within their scope, and must,
therefore, be governed by the rule as originally laid down. The Su-
preme Court in so recent a case as Southern Pacific v. Gallagher,25
citing the Robbins case, reiterated the rule that "A license tax on sales
by samples burdens one selling only goods from other states."
. MARSHALL V. YOUNT.
Federal Jurisdiction-Courts-Acquiring Jurisdiction by
Attachment of Nonresident's Property and
Constructive Service.
Originating with Toland v. Sprague,' an unbroken line of Supreme
Court decisions 2 have decreed that a federal court cannot acquire orig-
inal jurisdiction over a nonresident of the district in which the court is
20 The Revenue Act of 1937, of which this tax is a part, classifies it as a
privilege tax.
-" Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U. S. 489, 7 Sup. Ct. 592, 30
L. ed. 694 (1887).
22 See note 7, supra.
2222 U. S. 210, 32 Sup. Ct. 38, 56 L. ed. 168 (1911) (Banker Bros. of Penn-
sylvania kept no cars in stock, but sold by the use of demonstrators' cars man-
ufactured in New York. Purchasers contracted with Banker Bros. to buy cars
and pay the freight from New York, and received a warranty from the manufac-
turer. Banker Bros. accepted the drafts drawn on them by the manufacturer,
received the cars, and delivered them -to the purchasers. The Pennsylvania 2%
general sales tax was held applicable to such sales).
24 294 U. S. 169, 55 Sup. Ct. 358, 79 L. ed. 838 (1935) (a tax'of 3 cents per
gallon on fuels sold and delivered by distributors in Pennsylvania was held to
apply to a Pennsylvania corporation taking orders through agents and shipping
from Delaware to purchasers in Pennsylvania); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mc-
Goldrick, 279 N. Y. 184, 18 N. E. (2d) 25 (1938) (to the same effect).2 5
-U. S. -, -, 59 Sup. Ct. 389, 392, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 352, 355 (1939).
112 Pet. 300, 9 L. ed. 1093 (U,. S. 1836).
2 Ex parte Des Moines & M. Ry., 103 U. S. 794, 26 L. ed. 461 (1880) ; Laborde
v. Ubarri, 214 U. S. 173, 29 Sup. Ct. 552, 53 L. ed. 955 (1909); Big Vein Coal
Co. v. Read, 229 U. S. 31, 33 Sup. Ct. 694, 57 L. ed. 1053 (1913).
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sitting by attaching his property within the district and serving him
only constructively, at least where the cause of action is a purely per-
sonal 6ne ;3 but that attachment is an ancillary proceeding, available
only when jurisdiction in personant is acquired by personal service or
a general appearance.
4
Contrary to this restriction is the practice common to the state
courts whereby, pursuant to statutory authorization, property of a non-
resident defendant may be attached although the defendant is served
only constructively.5 The constitutional validity of such procedure has
not been seriously doubted since the decision of Pennoyer v. Neff.0
Sanction was found in the state's jurisdiction over all property within
its boundaries for the state court's judgment against the property
seized, although the judgment had no efficacy beyond that. 7  Construc-
tive service was deemed sufficient notice to the defendant when coupled
with the presumptive notice resulting from seizure of his property by
attachment.
8
Recent developments tend to spotlight the history of the federal
position. Closely adhering to a prior circuit court decision, 9 the United
States Supreme Court, in Toland v. Sprague, laid down the following
' But where the cause of action is purely in ren, e.g., to enforce a claim to
property rather than to enforce a personal obligation against the defendant, a
federal district court has jurisdiction to proceed against property lying within its
district although a nonresident defendant is served only constructively. This
authority arises from 18 STAT. 472 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §118 (1934), which em-
braces two classes of cases: (1) Suits to enforce any legal or equitable lien upon,
or claim to, real or personal property within the district; (2) suits to remove any
encumbrance or lien or cloud upon the title to such property.
The doctrine set forth in Toland v. Sprague has been followed in a host of
lower federal court decisions. Richmond v. Drefous, 20 Fed. Cas. No. 11,799
(C. C. D. R. I. 1831); Day v. Newark India Rubber Mfg. Co., 7 Fed. Cas. No.
3,685 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1850); Chittenden v. Darden, 5 Fed. Cas. No. 2,688
(C. C. N. D. Ga. 1875); Anderson v. Shaffer, 10 Fed. 266 (C. C. S. D. Ohio
1881) ; Boston Electric Co. v. Electric Gas Lighting Co., 23 Fed. 838 (C. C. D.
Mass. 1885); Noyes v. Canada, 30 Fed. 665 (C. C. D. Kan. 1887); Perkins v.
1-indryx, 40 Fed. 657 (C. C. D. Mass. 1889) ; Lackett v. Rumbaugh, 45 Fed. 23
(C. C. V. D. N. C. 1891): Bucyrus Co. v. McArthur, 219 Fed. 266 (M. D. Tenn.
1914); Cleveland & W. Coal Co. v. J. H. Hillman & Sons Co., 245 Fed. 200
(N. D. Ohio 1917).; An extensive collection of state decisions construing their respective statutes,
which permit constructive service on a nonresident defendant, is found in 9 RosE's
NOTES Ox UNITED STATES REPORTS (rev. ed. 1918) 1115-1120, as supplemented by
2 RosE's NOTES ON UNITED STATES REPORTS (Supp. 1932) 702-704.
' 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565 (1877) ; see Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. & Imp.
Co., 130 U. S. 559, 563. 9 Sup. Ct. 603, 605, 32 L. ed. 1045, 1048 (1890) ; Arndt
v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, 323, 10 Sup. Ct. 557, 561, 33 L. ed. 918, 920 (1890);
Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398, 405, 20 Sup. Ct. 410, 412, 44 L. ed. 520, 523 (1900)
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 393, 34 Sup. Ct. 779, 782, 58 L. ed. 1363, 1368
(1914).
Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308. 19 L. ed. 931 (U. S. 1870) ; Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565 (1877) ; Clark v. Wells, 203 U. S. 164, 27 Sup.
Ct. 43, 51 L. ed. 138 (1906).
' Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565 (1877) ; cf. Owenby v. Morgan,
256 U. S. 94, 111, 41 Sup. Ct. 433, 438, 65 L. ed. 837, 846 (1921).
'Picquet v. Swan, 19 Fed. Cas. No. 11,134 (C. C. D. Mass. 1828).
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propositions: (1) the federal courts may issue no process beyond the
territorial limits of their respective districts and may serve only persons
found within those limits, in the absence of positive legislation to the
contrary ;10 (2) Congressional acts" adopting the state practice for the
federal courts did not operate to enlarge the sphere of the federal
courts' jurisdiction, but merely prescribed the forms and modes of
process to be used in acquiring jurisdiction over persons within the
reach of such process; and (3) an attachment against a person's prop-
erty may issue out of a federal court only as a part of, or together with,
process served upon him personally. Major reliance was placed upon
the Eleventh Section of the Judiciary Act of 178912 (hereinafter re-
ferred to as Section 739) which' provided that no civil suit should be
brought in a district or circuit court ". . by any original process in
any other district than that whereof he [the defendant] is an inhabitant
or in which he shall be found at the time of serving the writ." Four
of the justices dissented from that part of the opinion dealing with at-
tachment upon constructive service on the ground that it was unneces-
sary for the decision, and, in two instances, expressed the belief that
such procedure was available in federal courts.
After the decision in Toland v. Sprague, two significant statutory
changes occurred. The Act of 187213 (hereinafter referred to as Sec-
tion 915) provided: "In the common law cases in the circuit and district
courts, the plaintiff shall be entitled to similar remedies, by attachment
or other process, against the property of the defendant, which are now
provided by the laws of the state in which such court is held for the
courts thereof; and such circuit and district courts may, from time to
time, by general rules adopt such state laws as may be in force in the
states where they are held in relation to attachment and other proc-
ess. . . ." And the Act of 1887,14 amending the venue restrictions of
Section 739, provided that in diversity-of-citizenship cases suit might
be brought in the district of either the plaintiff's or the defendant's
residence. Without straining the meaning of these enactments, it could
be said that they destroy the basis for the decision in Toland v.
Sprague.5 Yet when that contention was advanced, the Supreme
10 By virtue of Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a federal
district court, sitting in a state containing more than one district, may issue its
process throughout the entire state.111 STAT. §93 (1789) and 1 STAT. §275 (1792), 28 U. S. C. §724 (1934).
"REv. STAT. §739 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §112 (1934).
"REv. STAT. §915 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §726 (1934).
1424 STAT. §552 (1887) as amended 25 STAT. 433 (1888), 28 U. S. C. §112(1934).
1 Two lower federal courts asserted that Section 915 enlarged their jurisdiction
to permit the acquiring of original jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant by
means of attachment-and publication of summons. Guillow i,. Fontain, 11 Fed.
Cas. No. 5,861 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1875) ; Brooks v. Fry, 45 Fed. 776 (C. C. W. D.
1939]
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Court, in the Big Vein Coal Co.16 case reiterated the doctrine that at-
tachment in the federal courts is not a device for acquiring jurisdiction,
but is available solely as an auxiliary remedy when there has been per-
sonal service. Section 915 was summarily dealt with by remarking
that it had been before the Court in Ex parte Des Moines & M. Ry.' 7
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the Act of 1887 did not abrogate
the necessity for personal service, for had Congress intended such a
radical change it would have expressly so provided.' 8
The Court's position in these cases was somewhat compromised, at
least from the standpoint of consistent policy, by its decision of a re-
lated question in cases removed from state courts. Although a federal
court could not proceed originally against a nonresident by attachment
and constructive service, if a state court had acquired jurisdiction by
that procedure, a federal court succeeded to that jurisdiction upon re-
moval.' 9 And that was true where the state court had attached the
nonresident's property, but had not, prior to removal, completed the
formalities of service by which its jurisdiction would be perfected. In the
latter event, the federal court acquired an inchoate jurisdiction which
ripened into full jurisdiction over the attached property when the for-
malities of service were completed.20 Again, however, the Court found
statutory authority for its position. 21
Ark. 1891). However, numerous other lower federal court decisions had con-
strued Section 915 to pertain only to forms and modes of practice to be observed
when the federal court could obtain in personam jurisdiction: Nazro v. Cragin, 17
Fed. Cas. No. 10,062 (C. C. D. Iowa 1874); Harland v. United Lines Tel. Co.,
40 Fed. 308 (C. C. D. Conn. 1889); Lackett v. Rumbaugh, 45 Fed. 23 (C. C.
W. D. N. C. 1891); Central Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Chattanooga R. & C. R. R.,
68 Fed. 685 (C. C. E. D. Tenn. 1895); United States v. Brooke, 184 Fed. 341
(S. D. N. Y. 1910); Smith v. Reed, 210 Fed. 968 (N. D. Ohio 1912).
"8 Big Vein Coal Co. v. Read, 229 U. S. 31, 33 Sup. Ct. 694, 57 L. ed. 1053
(1913).
.7 103 U. S. 794, 26 L. ed. 461 (1880) (the Court omitted any mention of
Section 915).
" Lower federal courts had previously held that the Act of 1887 introduced
no new principle obviating the necessity for personal service. Harland v. United
Lines Tel. Co., 40 Fed. 308 (C. C. D. Conn. 1889) ; United States v. Brooke, 184
Fed. 341 (S. D. N. Y. 1910); Smith v. Reed, 210 Fed. 968 (N. D. Ohio 1912).
18 Courtney v. Pradt, 196 U. S. 89, 25 Sup. Ct. 208, 49 L. ed. 398 (1905);
Crocker Nat. Bank v. Ragenstecher, 44 Fed. 705 (C. C. D. Mass. 1890); Rich-
mond v. Brookings, 48 Fed. 241 (C. C. D. R. I. 1891); Vermilya v. Brown, 65
Fed. 149 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1894); Blumberg v. A. B. & E. L. Shaw Co., 131
Fed. 608 (C. C. N. Y. 1904).
"0 Clark v. Wells, 203 U. S. 164, 27 Sup. Ct. 43, 51 L. ed. 138 (1906) (suggest-
ing that no publication of service was necessary in federal court since defendant
had sufficient notice as evidenced by his special appearance to secure removal);
Lebensburger v. Scofield, 139 Fed. 380 (C. C. A. 6th, 1905) (publication of sum-
mons ordered by district court) ; Friedman Bros. & Sons Neckwear Co., Inc. v.
Greaney, 297 Fed. 478 (S. D. N. Y. 1923).
1 REv. STAT. §646 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §79 (1934) provides: "When any suit
shall be removed from a state court to a district count of the United States, any
attachment or sequestration of the goods or estate of the defendant had in such
suit in the state court shall hold -the goods or estate so attached or sequestered
[Vol. 18
NOTES AND COMMENTS
In the recent case of Rorick v. Devon Syndicate, Ltd.,2 2 suit was
brought in a state court against the nonresident defendant on a per-
sonal cause of action. An attachment was levied upon property of the
defendant, and service by publication completed. The defendant secured
a removal to the federal district court on a special appearance. A sup-
plemental attachment issued from the district court and was levied upon
additional property of the defendant. On defendant's motion, this latter
attachment was dissolved on the ground that no personal service had
been made upon the defendant. This ruling was affirmed in the circuit
court of appeals.2 3 Speaking for the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Doug-
las proceeded to assail vigorously the holding in Toland v. Sprague and
the cases subsequently affirming it. Three arguments buttress his attack:
First, if Section 73924 justified the Court's conclusion that a defendant
must be personally served to permit the levy of an attachment, that
justification was removed by the statutory revisal authorizing suit in
the district of either the plaintiff's or defendant's residence. Second,
the philosophy underlying the decision in Toland v. Sprague and the
Big Vein Coal Co. case, 7iz., that it is unjust to adjudicate a person's
rights without affording him notice by personal service, 25 was repudiated
by Section 64626 and by the decision in the removal cases. Third, Con-
gress has, in Section 915,27 expressly granted to plaintiffs in the federal
courts the same remedies by attachment or other process that are avail-
able in the state courts.
The actual decision in the principal case is confined to the proposi-
tion that, where attachment has supplied quasi-in-ren- jurisdiction to a
state court prior to removal, the federal court is permitted to issue a
supplemental attachment, provided such a remedy is available under the
state procedure. Hence, the hostile and extended consideration of the
doctrine of Toland v. Sprague appears to be gratuitous dictum, for the
to answer the final judgment or decree in the same manner as by law they 'would
have been held to answer final judgment or decree had it been rendered by the
court in which said suit was commenced. .. "
22 306 U. S. 626, 59 Sup. Ct. 643, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 620 (1939).
.' Rorick v. Devon Syndicate, 100 F. (2d) 844 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939). Additional
factors, irrelevant to the present discussion, which were relied on in the disposition
of the case, were: (1) the district court held the original affidavit in attachment
void because taken before a notary disqualified as an "interested" party; (2) the
circuit court held the attachment issued by the state court to be premature and
void because executed before commencement of service by publication, in violation
of a state statute. Both these holdings were subsequently reversed by the Supreme
Court as being based on an erroneous construction of the state statutes.
2, REV. STAT. §739 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §112 (1934).
22 See Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300, 329, 9 L. ed. 1093, 1105 (U. S. 1836);
Picquet v. Swan, 19 Fed. Cas. No. 11,134 at 613 (C. C. D. Mass. 1828) ; Nazro v.
Cragin, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 10,062 at 1260 (C. C. D. Iowa 1874).2 REV. STAT. §646 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §79 (1934) ; see note 22, supra.
2 REV. STAT. §915 (1872), 28 U. S. C. §726 (1934).
1939]
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question actually raised and the reasoning of the lower courts could have
been disposed of by reference to the removal cases discussed above.
Speculation arises as to the motives of the Court in discussing-
and then adversely-the doctrine of Toland v. Sprague. Was it merely
an attempt to educate the lower courts on the distinction between the
use of attachment in cases of removal and in cases of original juris-
diction? Such a purpose would hardly necessitate criticism of the doc-
trine. Or was the Court intimating that on a future occasion it may not
refuse to allow a federal district court to acquire original jurisdiction
by way of attachment and constructive service? Such an intimation
would not be surprising from a Court which has recently displayed its
willingness to re-examine any questionable precedents. 28 The disparity
between the scope of attachment in the state courts and in the federal
courts may be an unfortunate retention.29 In the light of the recent
revision of federal procedure allowing federal process to run throughout
the state in which the court sits,30 a change permitting federal courts
to acquire original jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant by means
of attachment and constructive service might be a desirable adjunct to
the usefulness of the federal courts.
JAmES K. DORSETT, JR.
Libel and Slander-Publication-Privilege-
Dictation to a Stenographer.
Plaintiff, having been discharged from the employ of defendant
company for alleged misconduct, went to defendant's manager and re-
quested a separation notice which was required to be filed with the
Unemployment Compensation Commission. The manager made a nota-
tion on a blank notice that the cause of separation should be "Miscon-
duct", and, at his request, plaintiff took the notice to defendant's
stenographer who filled it out and inserted as the cause of separation
the word "Misconduct". In an action for libel, the Court sustained the
defendant's demurrer, holding that there was no publication to support
the action, as communication to a stenographer was insufficient.1
Much authority supports the decision reached here. On the theory
that a corporation can act only through its agents,2 it is held that com-
"5 Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. ed. 1188 (1938) ;
Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 59 Sup. Ct. 595, 83 L. ed.
Adv. Ops. 577 (1939).
" Early criticism was found in Dormitzer v. Illinois & St. Louis Bridge Co.,
6 Fed. 217, 218 (C. C. D. Mass. 1881).
" Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(f).
Satterfield v. McLellan Stores, 215 N. C. 582, 2 S. E. (2d) 709 (1939).
2 Cartwright-Caps Co. v. Fischel and Kaufman, 113 Miss. 359, 74 So. 278(1917).
[VCol. 18
